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Abstract  
Surveillance for security requires communication between systems and humans, 
involves behavioural and multimedia research, and demands an objective 
benchmarking for the performance of system components. Metadata 
representation schemes are extremely important to facilitate (system) 
interoperability and to define ground truth annotations for surveillance research 
and benchmarks. Surveillance places specific requirements on these metadata 
representation schemes. This paper offers a clear and coherent terminology, and 
uses this to present these requirements and to evaluate them in three ways: their 
fitness in breadth for surveillance design patterns, their fitness in depth for a 
specific surveillance scenario, and their realism on the basis of existing schemes. 
It is also validated that no existing metadata representation scheme fulfils all 
requirements. Guidelines are offered to those who wish to select or create a 
metadata scheme for surveillance for security. 
 
Keywords: surveillance, human behaviour, annotation, metadata representation 
scheme, event, action, multimodal, multi-sensor, ONVIF, MPEG-7, PETS. 
1. Introduction 
Surveillance systems are used for a wide range of settings and purposes. They 
have been proven valuable in the fight against national and international terrorism, 
they support national security and border policy, and they help to fight crime in 
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public places [19]. In these settings, successful operation depends on the effective 
use of collected data and metadata. Metadata are necessary to transfer knowledge, 
and to train, test and evaluate surveillance personnel and algorithms.  
In surveillance systems for security, these metadata schemes are important for 
operational, technical, scientific and commercial reasons. First, from an 
operational perspective, metadata schemes are needed to efficiently create a 
surveillance report. Second, from a technical perspective, the modular and 
distributed nature of surveillance systems requires metadata schemes to allow 
communication between the subcomponents. Third, from a scientific and 
commercial perspective, they are a precondition for defining ground truth 
annotations and benchmarking different systems. Fourth, from a purely scientific 
perspective, a metadata scheme – in the form of standard test resources and a 
standard for semantic annotation – facilitates cooperation between supporting 
research domains.  
 
The four perspectives described above place different requirements on metadata 
schemes. Although metadata schemes have been proposed by relevant 
communities (e.g. industrial [32], scientific [6], governmental [14]), no single 
scheme covers all four perspectives. Also, the lack of alignment between the 
individual schemes, complicates the ability to share information and make 
systems interoperable. Standardization and interoperability are important because 
the threat of tomorrow may be unknown at design time. So, it is likely that in 
order to mitigate future incidents, it is necessary to connect a surveillance system 
to other surveillance systems or data sources in order to share information. 
A sign of a lack of communication between relevant communities is found when 
studying the respective terminologies. The meaning of the word “behaviour” in 
behavioural research means “the reaction of a cognitive agent on a stimulus”. 
However, in multimedia research the meaning tends towards “an action of a 
person”, thereby losing the notion of action-reaction and of cognition behind 
behaviour. Thus, the opportunity we miss is the reasoning about why someone 
performs an action. This reasoning reveals their intent, either malevolent or 
beneficent. There is no right or wrong in this regard, but a lack of awareness on 
such differences will hinder research and cooperation. 
 
For a particular project, or for bringing together several communities, one may 
wish to select or create a (new) scheme for surveillance for security. After a 
project team or community reaches consensus on a set of requirements (focus of 
this paper), the phase of selecting or creating a (new) metadata scheme can start. 
This step can be supported with upper ontologies (like Cyc, SUMO and DOLCE 
[20,24,29]) and accompanying ontology mapping and/or database linking. That 
phase is out of scope of this paper. This paper offers guidelines to those who wish 
to select or create a (new) scheme for surveillance for security, both on the level 
of a (global) surveillance community, and on the level of a local project team. 
The work presented here is the first step in the development of a complete 
metadata scheme for surveillance in security. Our contribution is that we propose 
a clear terminology, propose requirements, validate them in a typical, complex 
surveillance scenario, evaluate them against common design patterns in 
surveillance, and illustrate how existing schemes support or neglect these 
requirements.  
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This paper is structured in a way that puts the proposed requirements in focus. 
Section 2 summarizes related work. Section 3 describes the terminology. In 
section 4 we propose the requirements for a metadata representation scheme for 
surveillance for security. Section 5 evaluates the requirements extent to which the 
requirements are useful (for typical surveillance practice), practical (by applying 
them to an example) and realistic (by evaluating several existing metadata 
schemes against them), and section 6 discusses the findings of our evaluation. 
Section 7 summarizes the main conclusions. 
2. Overview of Related Work 
This section describes the context and related work on surveillance and existing 
metadata schemes. In 2005 Francois [12] focused on the importance of describing 
events in multimedia data, and continued by showing how relations between 
events and objects can be used to describe multimedia data in detail. In 2007, 
Westermann [46] built a case for a common event model for multimedia data. He 
mentions multiple new perspectives on events, e.g. he describes why causality as 
a type of relation between events is worthwhile to describe. In the same year, 
Annesley [2] started from the needs of the application domain of surveillance, and 
gave three types of requirements: from the scene, from the system, and non-
functional requirements. Schallauer in 2009 [37] further elaborated on the notion 
of requirements from the surveillance domain for the design of metadata schemes, 
i.e. they described 11 requirements which are easily recognisable, e.g. 
“description of event and their properties”, “flexible in terms of modalities and 
sensor types” and “abstraction levels”. SanMiguel in 2009 [36] further elaborated 
on the requirements of the system, and particularly also in the capabilities of a 
surveillance system, e.g. in terms of algorithms such as tracking. Each case of this 
previous work introduces its own metadata scheme which distracts from the 
quality of the requirements that they gave. None of these papers give an 
evaluation of the requirements which they started with, for example, none of these 
papers is explicit in terms of which, or how many abstraction layers are needed. 
For the evaluation of our requirements on realism, several existing metadata 
schemes were selected. This is done without aiming to obtain a complete list of all 
schemes, since the goal of our paper is to propose and evaluate requirements for 
such types of schemes and not to present an extensive survey. Our selection of 
metadata representation schemes for this paper is based on three disjunctive 
criteria, i.e. qualifying on one criterion is sufficient for selection. The three criteria 
are: (i) familiarity to audience, (ii) capability of reasoning about intent/behaviour, 
and (iii) footprint of current application. The rationale for selecting these criteria 
are explained next. As a consequence of criteria (i) and (iii) schemes are covered 
that are considered and used for research and also applications. This is important 
because surveillance is both an active research topic and it is also widely applied 
in practice. Due to criterion (ii) schemes are covered that are not yet known well 
and/or are not yet applied in practice. This category of schemes includes the ones 
that are relatively new and aim to address insufficiencies in the well-known 
schemes, i.e., including metadata beyond the sensor, beyond the static scene, and 
beyond the standard processing of objects and tracks. This paper covers new 
schemes that include metadata about intent and behaviour. These are important 
elements for effective surveillance, because one of the objectives of surveillance 
is to early detect and potentially prevent crimes. Assessment of intent and 
behaviour facilitates reaching this objective. 
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The first criterion is familiarity with the relevant communities of multimedia 
research, behaviour research and surveillance industry. These schemes are 
therefore taken from international standards bodies (ISO, W3C [13], MPEG-7 
[26,38,39]), scientific languages (VIPER [8,23,45], CVML [7,21], SAM [37], 
ETISEO [10,28]), scientific conferences and benchmarks (TRECVID [33,43], 
PETS [11,34], CAVIAR [6]) or governmental benchmarks (i-LIDS [14]), or 
relevant communities such as the industry collectives PSIA [35] and ONVIF [32]. 
The second criterion is coverage of some of the newer concepts such as reasoning 
about intent and behaviour (HumanML [13]). The third and final criterion is 
whether the scheme is (commercially) applied, i.e. has a large footprint (Milestone 
[25], Noldus [30], ANVIL [17,18]). Several of these languages are based on 
VIPER (e.g., PETS, iLIDS, TrecVID) or CVML (PETS, CAVIAR) and many are 
based on XML (e.g., CVML, VIPER, HumanML, ONVIF scene description 
interface, SAM, Milestone alert data). Together, this gives us a broad view, from 
relatively “open” languages that can be used for a wide range of applications, to 
more specific languages that were developed to serve a specific goal. 
3. Terminology 
To create a single reference frame for communication between relevant 
communities, a coherent terminology is proposed in this paper. This terminology 
is mainly based on terms typically used in metadata representation schemes and is 
enriched with frequently used terms from the surveillance and the system 
engineering domains. Sections 4 and 5 demonstrate that this terminology is indeed 
suitable for defining metadata for surveillance. 
The term metadata itself may need some additional clarification 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metadata]. In this paper the definition of descriptive 
metadata is used, which is data describing instances of application data. However, 
in many emerging technologies data on the structure of the system are used during 
the runtime phase of the system, because this allows for adaptivity, autonomy, 
traceability and transparency. The manner in which the metadata are acquired 
(e.g. through manual annotation, automated sensing or through configuration 
files) is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Surveillance is the process of watching over a person or place [22]. In general, 
this is done to protect someone or something and, as such, has different specific 
goals before, during or after a specific incident. Typical surveillance examples 
cover prevention (deterrent), preparation (training or creating a baseline for 
normal behaviour), mitigation of threats and direct after effects and investigation 
after the incident. In this paper, surveillance is limited to security, e.g. fighting 
crime and terrorists. 
A system is a construct or collection of different elements that together produce 
results not obtainable by the elements alone [15] (Fig. 1). A perceptual system is a 
system that has the ability to perceive itself and/or its environment. A surveillance 
system is a perceptual system with the function of surveillance. A typical 
surveillance system consists of machine components (e.g., the sensors, storage 
and communication) and a human operator. 
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Figure 1. The relations between context, environment, (perceptual) system, sensor and scene. 
 
The environment is the system’s surrounding that could interact with the system. 
The typical environment for a surveillance system is the area under surveillance 
and the location(s) of the system components. A scene is information that flows 
from a physical environment into a perceptual system via sensory transduction. 
Within the perceptual system this information is formalized as a subset called 
'image of the scene' and is at the lowest abstraction level represented by recorded 
footage.  
 
The context of a surveillance system consists of the factors that influence the 
system and necessarily include the environment and the scene. Typical examples 
of surveillance context are the local culture, the level of terror threat, and the 
weather conditions. Additionally, world knowledge as prior probability, and 
known correlations between events and actions, are also a part of the surveillance-
system context.  
 
The data from the sensor can be interpreted at different levels of abstraction 
[16,40] as illustrated in Fig. 2. Using specific terminology for metadata on each 
level greatly facilitates scientific and engineering discussions. 
 
Figure 2. Multi-layered view on abstraction of information (JDL or NAIHS model [16,40]). 
 
A sensor produces signals, which can be processed to form observations 
(synonym features). Observations are individual measurements. Multiple 
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observations can be made of the same phenomenon over time, through different 
sensors, from different viewpoints or in different modalities. For example, the 
colour of an object, as observed by multiple cameras under different lighting 
conditions, results in different pixel colour values for the same object. Even 
though the colour of the real object is the same, the actual internal representation 
from multiple cameras is different. A surveillance system needs to be 
accommodated to cope with conflicting observations, possibly even benefitting 
from it. 
 
An entity is an object (or part of an object) whose presence is relevant to the 
surveillance system. Typical entities are cars, persons and buildings. The 
relevance of an entity to a surveillance system establishes the specificity with 
which it needs to described. For example, a person in a car could be describe by 
one entity for some applications, but could be two for other applications. There is 
a tension with being exhaustive in the entities in the ontology. It is common to use 
the part-of relationship, object inheritance and spatial relations to model complete 
worlds of relevant entities. The perceptual system and subcomponents themselves 
can also be entities. This is typically the case when the function of the 
surveillance system depends on being able to reason about its components, e.g. to 
optimise resource allocation (“where do we point this pan-tilt-zoom camera?”), or 
to create resilience in case of malfunction or attack against the surveillance system 
itself.  
 
Security and surveillance are concerned with (among other issues) protecting 
against harmful actions. Such harmful actions (i.e. protecting, managing 
resources) are done by an autonomous agent. This is a subclass of the class 
“entity”, and it can be a person or an autonomous automated system that takes 
actions based on perceptual stimuli. The complementary class of an agent is an 
inanimate object, e.g., buildings, locations and vehicles. Depending on the 
application it is relevant to make a further distinction in immovable inanimate 
objects such as buildings and moveable inanimate objects such as a briefcase. 
 
An action is something done as a movement in contrast to doing nothing, and can 
only be performed by an agent with a certain level of autonomy. An action is 
limited in diversity, is more or less continuous, and is seen outside the scope of a 
stimulus-response process. Examples of actions are walking, smoking, shopping 
and driving a car. The activity is similar to an action, but considers a longer period 
of time. Taking a plane to travel to another country is no longer an action, but 
should qualify as an activity. An event is an observable occurrence of something: 
an action performed by someone at the scene, or a state change within the 
perceptual system. For example, a power loss on one of the surveillance cameras 
could be detected and classified as an event, but would not classify as an action.  
 
Entities, actions, events and their attributes are observables [4]. In their context 
they form a scenario: a synoptical collage consisting of a meaningful series of 
actions and events. One inseparable moment of a scenario is a situation: the 
constellation of objects and their interrelations, placed in an environment and a 
context. Within a scenario, entities are involved in the events and actions. 
Sometimes as actor, sometimes as subject of an action. Therefore, the entities 
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have a role in the scenario. A scenario occurs in the environment of the 
surveillance system. 
 
Behaviour is the reaction of an autonomous agent to a stimulus in relation to its 
environment, which includes other agents or the perceptual system itself. This 
reaction can be immediate or delayed, overt or covert, conscious or subconscious, 
voluntary or involuntary, and internal or external. Behaviour expresses the 
relation between stimulus and reaction, as compared to activities expressing the 
actions alone and, therefore, provides more insight into an agent’s intentions. A 
stimulus can intentionally be introduced as an intervention designed to reveal 
deviant behaviour. In such a case, the way the subject reacts to the stimulus 
discloses its intent. The consequence is that behaviour cannot be described as a 
stand-alone activity, but must be expressed in relation to an agent, a stimulus to 
that agent (i.e. the history of events within the perceptual range of that agent) and 
his environment. 
 
A goal is a desired end-state (situation) for an agent. An agent can aim for 
multiple, sometimes conflicting, goals at the same time. For example, an agent’s 
goal can be to mitigate the impact of calamities, to prevent crime, or to collect 
evidence in the case of crime. Intent is the state of an agent that directs its action 
towards a specific goal. Intent towards an illegal goal is what is required to make 
an illegal action a criminal action. Such intents are also known as a hostile intent. 
 
A security risk is the occurrence probability of a particular unwanted situation. A 
risk is chance times impact. If the unwanted situation actually occurs (chance 
equals 1) then it becomes a security incident. A risk refers to a situation that has 
not yet occurred, and therefore cannot yet be observed. The impact of a scenario is 
expressed as the impact on the goal of a particular agent. A plan, the means an 
agent utilizes towards its goal, consists of a set of actions resulting in a scenario 
that achieves the goal. A modus operandi is the legal term for a plan with an 
illegal or criminal goal [42]. A security threat is an indication or warning of a 
security incident, which can be more or less concrete. 
 
An ontology is the working model operating on a set of concepts, such as entities, 
that are specified to create a vocabulary for exchanging information. Typical 
problems for an ontology include the clustering of entities, relating within a 
hierarchy, and subdividing entities according to similarities and differences. The 
terms defined in this section create an ontology; however, for the purpose of 
surveillance, surveillance-related concepts should also be introduced in the 
ontology, e.g. inanimate object:fence, action:running and event:sensor failure. 
 
The next sections discuss respectively requirements for, and applications of, 
surveillance metadata representation schemes, using the terminology from the 
current section.  
4. Requirements for Metadata Schemes 
Nine requirements for metadata schemes for surveillance for security are 
identified. The purpose of this section is to be as specific as possible with regard 
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to these requirements. The first requirement is about coverage of the surveillance 
domain. Next follow five requirements which are related to the five abstraction 
levels of Figure 2. The final three requirements are related to traceability, 
uncertainty and chance and observation capabilities. In section 5, for the schemes 
introduced in section 2, it is determined whether they support these requirements. 
4.1 Coverage of surveillance domain (requirement 1) 
Concepts should be specified to cover all relevant concepts in the surveillance 
domain. For example, the concept immobile inanimate object will, for any useful 
application in surveillance, probably need to be further specified into house, office 
building and road. This allows to take the difference of such concepts into account 
when reasoning about them. Which level of detail is needed depends on the 
specific goal and context of a particular surveillance system. For example if the 
goal is merely intruder detection in a sterile zone, then the concept of a car is 
sufficient. If the goal is to detect suspicious activity on a parking lot with lots of 
cars and people, then a notion of an (perhaps yet unseen) person in a car may be 
necessary. In the evaluation of the requirements in section 5 it will be 
demonstrated which concepts and relations should be defined for a pickpocket 
case. In each of the next five requirements (about data abstraction) examples are 
given of concepts which should be included in an ontology for surveillance. 
 
There are limits to the amount of specificity that is useful for surveillance. For 
example, in the surveillance domain, the relevance of objects smaller than on the 
level of “limbs” is usually very low. Below that level, they would simply be 
attributes of objects, such as “hand-palm-scan”, or “face-scan”. However, in the 
medical domain, this is typically where it starts to become relevant, and the 
definition of smaller objects is more than relevant, e.g. “kidney”, “aorta”, etc. The 
mapping of such an ontology to ontologies of other domains is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Too much freedom in covering concepts may lead to bloated 
ontologies and redundant concepts, which hamper usability. 
4.2 Metadata about sensor (requirement 2) 
Metadata about the sensor and resulting signal should be described. 
The first abstraction level comprises the sensor. Its type (camera, radar, 
microphone), placement, orientation (i.e. internal and external calibration), 
platform, cardinality, resolution, internal clock, and configuration determines a lot 
about the signals coming from it. For active sensors the location and type of the 
transmitting device could also be relevant, such as the radar transmitter or light 
source. 
 
These data are often crucial to interpret signals coming from sensors. E.g., without 
these metadata, the forensics professional is left to analyse the (video) signal itself 
to determine the possible contents and time stamps of data. Aspects of the 
resulting signal, such as spatial and temporal resolution, determine what can be 
inferred from the data. With technologies such as super-resolution, stitching and 
sensor arrays, it is possible to construct a “virtual” sensor from more than one 
sensor(type), which still ”only” produces a new type of signal. Relevant 
information about the surveillance system itself can be derived from this 
metadata, such as covered area of the sensor plan (including white spots and 
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overlaps), the dependencies of resources such as communication and power and 
whether a component has been tampered with. Another motivation to describe 
metadata about the hardware/software of a surveillance system is standardization 
in interoperability. Yesterday’s threat may not be the same as the threat of 
tomorrow. This implies that not all relevant connections for a surveillance system 
may be known at design time. Depending on future unknown events, it may be 
necessary to connect a surveillance system to other systems or data sources. This 
system of systems approach requires metadata on the system components to be 
available, in order to manage interoperability runtime. 
4.3 Metadata about observations (requirement 3) 
Metadata on observations should be described separately from metadata on 
objects, their attributes, events and actions. 
Entities, actions, events and their attributes can be observed by multiple sensors 
and different modalities simultaneously and/or successively. A scream can be 
heard, but can also be seen by observing the face. Multiple sensors can 
simultaneously observe the same property or activity. Making an observation of a 
person in the scene does not mean that the system automatically knows to which 
specific internal representation of persons this observation must be attributed to. 
Typical solutions for signal attribution are detection, tracking and recognition 
technologies, assisted by a robust geometrical model of how sensors physically 
relate to the environment and/or to each other i.e. a calibration and a 
synchronisation. This requirement becomes more important when the number of 
sensors increases, driven by falling costs of sensors and the benefits of 
overlapping sensors, such as alternative viewpoints in case of occlusions, 
redundancy during component failure and seamless integration with neighbouring 
sensors. Examples of concepts which should be in an ontology for this 
requirement are detections (bounding boxes) of vehicle, number plate, person and 
face in video signals and scream- and broken-glass-detections in audio signals. 
4.4 Metadata on entities, events, actions and attributes 
(requirement 4) 
Metadata about observables should be described. 
The third abstraction level is the level of entities, events, actions and their 
attributes, i.e. the observables. Which observables are relevant is determined by 
the purpose of the system. For some applications a moving car is one object, for 
others a moving car consists by definition of two objects: the car and the driver, 
and yet another application even allows uncertainty about the existence of the 
driver until he can be seen directly, or can be inferred from the car’s behaviour. 
The identity of a person is also covered on this level. Examples of concepts which 
should be in an ontology for this requirement are: 
- for entities: persons, vehicles, groups of persons and their location; 
- for events: sensor failure; 
- for actions: giving, taking, talking, falling, hitting and running; 
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4.5 Metadata about situations and scenarios (requirement 5) 
Situations and scenarios should be described by describing relevant relations 
between observables. 
So far, there are sensors, signals and observations, and entities, events and actions 
and their attributes. The new element to be introduced is the relation between 
these concepts, because together they make up situations and, when seen over 
time, scenarios. These relations can be of different natures, such as temporal 
(before, while, after) and spatial (above, under, in) [27,46]. Other, less 
conventional relations are equally possible, such as interaction, including 
communication (talks with, gives to, follows) and legal (owns, is married to, 
suspected of). These relationships are essential to interpret the situation. The 
relationship causation between actions and events is also relevant for surveillance 
and security. Hostile agents (pickpockets, burglars, terrorists) execute a modus 
operandi because it causes their desired goal. Recognizing such chains of cause 
and effect in the environment of a surveillance system helps to predict (unwanted) 
situations. This makes a surveillance system less dependent (and therefore 
vulnerable) on pre-configured rules, and allows the system to reason ad hoc about 
the effects of certain situations, which increases the resilience and adaptivity of 
the surveillance system. 
4.6 Metadata about risks and impact (requirement 6) 
Goals, hypothetical scenarios, risk and impact should be described. 
Typically, a security system, including the human in the loop, is configured in 
such a way that it has an aggregated positive impact on the goals of the security 
system (i.e. to prepare for the case of calamities, to prevent calamities, to mitigate 
the impact of calamities or to collect evidence in the case of calamities). 
Describing goals, hypothetical scenario’s, risk and impact also lets the security 
system use information about goals of others, such as those of criminals or those 
of potential victims. This requirement then also facilitates the emergence of (semi-
) autonomous surveillance systems, such as UAVs. If a goal is a desired end-
situation then this requirement requires the possibility to describe a situation 
which does not exist yet, and to link this to a cognitive agent as one of his goals. 
4.7 Traceability (requirement 7) 
Metadata should describe the origins of data. 
The ability to trace where a particular piece of information comes from, allows 
surveillance systems and their maintainers, designers and researchers to trace 
system errors and false hypotheses about the known world back to its origins. For 
forensics there is the question of authenticity: has this information been tampered 
with or not? Being able to reconstruct the path of how the information came to be 
in the first place, is then very helpful. This is only possible if metadata contains 
references to the abstraction level directly below it. For example, a signal should 
have a reference to the sensor (or human) that it came from, an entity should have 
references to the observations in signals that its instantiation was based on, and a 
situation should have references to the entities it is comprised of. 
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4.8 Uncertainty and chance (requirement 8) 
The metadata representation scheme should facilitate that signals, observations, 
observables and situations are accompanied by the level of certainty that the 
responsible subcomponent has with regard to the accuracy of it and any 
alternatives. 
Uncertainties are part of every step of data and information processing and can 
arise from all sorts of angles. The precision of the calibration of sensors is limited. 
Memory and bandwidth constraints in humans and machines lead to the rounding 
of numbers, and there may be multiple conflicting hypotheses about the real 
world, all in some degree supported by the available data points. The purpose of a 
surveillance system is not to have the perfect situational awareness, but to have a 
situational awareness that is good enough to get the job done. Typically this leads 
to the goal of information dominance, i.e. the situation that your information 
position is significantly better than all realistically possible opponents. When one 
has information about the confidence level of a piece of data (e.g., of detections or 
matches), one will typically also want to have alternatives to that data. In many 
ways of describing certainty or chance, alternatives are intrinsically given, e.g. a 
binominal distribution for the height of a person. 
4.9 Observation capabilities (requirement 9) 
The metadata representation scheme should facilitate the description of available 
(technical) capabilities in relation to possible data requests. 
A surveillance system should be able to reason about alternative ways to get the 
required type of information, which requires knowledge about the available 
technical capabilities in relation to the data request. For example: is there a 
capability of zooming in to get more resolution and contrast on the face of that 
person, or is there another camera available? This requirement is not limited to the 
sensor, but also includes processing capabilities such as: “is face recognition 
available?”, or “do we have tracking available?”, and “can we combine audio with 
video to determine who started shouting in a crowd?” It is also useful to describe 
(the capabilities) of human operators: “”how many operators do we need to 
monitor these video feeds live?” 
4.10 Other requirements 
When actually designing a metadata scheme, more requirements than these will 
have to be taken into account: streaming metadata, openness and ease-of-use are 
some that come to mind. However, these appear to be requirements that are 
generally addressed with either tooling, methodology or legal actions and, 
therefore, do not depend on the metadata scheme as such. 
5. Evaluation 
This section evaluates the requirements in three ways. First, the benefits of the 
four requirements related to abstraction levels are evaluated in breadth in terms of 
common and emerging surveillance design patterns (Sec. 5.1). Second, the need 
for the requirements is illustrated in depth in a complex surveillance example of 
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pickpocketing (Sec. 5.2). Third, the requirements are evaluated against existing 
metadata schemes to identify which scheme fulfils which requirements (Sec. 5.3). 
5.1 Evaluation on common surveillance design patterns 
This section evaluates the four requirements related to abstraction levels 
(requirements 2-5) against good practices for surveillance systems. In our 
experience with the police and commercial surveillance companies, we found that 
surveillance is commonly done with a limited set of basic design patterns. Design 
pattern are general reusable solutions to commonly occurring problems, which are 
often used in architecture [1] and object-oriented software development [5]. We 
define these ‘good practices’ in the surveillance domain now explicitly as design 
patterns, or surveillance patterns. These patterns have similar purposes (create 
situational awareness), and similar input (e.g., video, sound, tweets) and output 
(hit/alarm or no-hit). We identify the following surveillance patterns: “threshold 
alarm”, “profiling”, “concentric circles of protection”, “bag of observations” and 
“scenario view”. These surveillance patterns can be applied by both machine and 
human, but a human professional can shift seamlessly between these patterns, 
while machines must be explicitly designed to apply them. Each pattern has its 
own strengths and weaknesses, so there is no perfect surveillance pattern: each 
pattern has to fit requirements such as efficiency, efficacy and lack of 
invasiveness, all of which depend on the local situation. The surveillance patterns 
are described in order of increasing complexity. 
 
The surveillance pattern “Threshold Alarm” works on the basis of putting a 
threshold on the attributes of a single observable. Typical and often implicit 
reasoning in this pattern is to consider only the presence (or absence) of an entity, 
e.g. smoke or a person. This pattern is used in situations where a very specific risk 
is present (i.e. fire or burglary) in an environment with very little distractions, 
which allows for highly specialized, yet relatively simple observation. A metadata 
representation scheme that accommodates this pattern must be able to separate 
observables (smoke or a person) (req. 4) from situation assessment (fire in the 
building, or a burglar on the premises) (req. 5) to apply the threshold in between. 
 
The surveillance pattern “Profiling” extrapolates information about an entity 
from multiple other data points. In security and surveillance this surveillance 
pattern is often implemented in border control and object security. E.g. behaviour 
profiling uses data about behaviour of a person to make an assessment about the 
intent of that person. The data representation scheme must facilitate linking 
multiple aspects, actions and behaviour to a single entity [3]. In the case of 
behavioural profiling, as all of these actions and behaviour will (generally) not 
happen at the same time. This could require functionality such as person tracking 
and recognition, which in turn may require additional support from the 
representation scheme, such as the description of an identity (req. 4), or some 
locally unique (biometric) feature. 
 
When combined with physical barriers, the surveillance pattern “Concentric 
circles of protection” has the function of containing the threat in compartments. 
This pattern is typically used in border security, object security and VIP 
protection. In general, this patterns allows the surveillance system to designate the 
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relation between one entity and another entity that needs protection. At a 
minimum, this requires a general idea of the asset to protect (req. 4) and the 
notion of relative locations (req. 5). With regard to the perceiving components of 
a surveillance system (i.e. sensors and surveillance personnel), their location 
should be known in relation to the compartments in order to know to which 
compartment their output should be attributed. 
 
New surveillance patterns are also emerging. The “Bag of Observations” pattern 
works by indiscriminately combining multiple observations to estimate the 
situation. In the surveillance industry this pattern is experimentally used for 
situations with very difficult reasoning about an individual person: e.g., crowd 
management, or urban security. In such contexts, much data are available and can 
be mined for general behaviour patterns. Combining multiple observables 
facilitates more robust performance than by putting a threshold on a single 
observable. On the other hand, this surveillance pattern misses information on the 
interaction between different entities (e.g., communication or movement patterns), 
or on the relation between events and actions (e.g., successive actions are 
performed by the same person, versus by different persons), so it does not use 
requirement 5. 
 
A second emerging surveillance pattern is the “Scenario View”. With the 
surveillance patterns described above, it is not possible to describe all aspects of 
scenarios with complex behaviour, i.e. behaviour which involves changing 
relations between multiple persons. In the surveillance pattern “Profiling” it is 
difficult to describe the communication between collaborating pickpockets, the 
interactions of a drugs deal in a city square, early signs of a rip-deal in an airport 
or simply the relation ownership in a lost-luggage scenario [41]. This illustrates 
the need for a pattern that includes dynamic relations between entities such as X 
can see Y, X speaks with Y, X follows Y and X owns Z. This surveillance pattern 
needs -in fact exploits- requirement 5. 
 
These five surveillance patterns have the purpose of creating situational awareness 
by analysing from low level sensor data all the way up to situational awareness. 
They require support in the metadata scheme –either in their output, their input or 
in their internal working- for four levels of information abstraction, which are 
addressed by four of the requirements. Table 1 compares these four requirements 
against these common and emerging surveillance patterns. The next section 5.2 
illustrates how the surveillance patterns use this information. 
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Table 1: Comparison of surveillance design patterns on four of the abstraction level requirements. 
A cross in a cell means that this pattern needs this requirement to be addressed in order to be able 
to work. 
 Common Emerging 
Requirement (number) Threshold 
alarm 
Profiling Concentric circles 
of protection 
Bag of 
observations 
Scenario 
view 
Metadata about the sensor (2) X X X X X 
Metadata about features/observations (3) X X X X X 
Metadata about entities, events, actions 
and their attributes (4) 
 X X X X 
Metadata about situations and scenarios 
(relations between observables) (5) 
  X  X 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, these four requirements 
(abstraction levels) are all actually needed by these surveillance patterns. Second, 
no additional requirements are needed (with regard to the metadata scheme) to 
support these surveillance patterns. Third, this table shows, not surprisingly, that 
these surveillance patterns all require metadata about the sensor and about 
features. And fourth, there also seems to be a correlation between the complexity 
of a surveillance pattern, and both the number and abstraction level of 
requirements. Together these conclusions support the first main conclusion that 
these are the right requirements given these common and emerging surveillance 
patterns. 
5.2 Evaluation on a pickpocket case study 
Current state-of-the-art automatic video analysis tools focus on surveillance tasks 
that are simple for humans, such as person tracking and action recognition. For an 
in depth evaluation of all proposed requirements, we focus on the complex task of 
detecting a pickpocket scenario (see online video [31]), which contains many of 
the simpler tasks.  
 
The modus operandi was constructed by the Amsterdam police, based on actual 
observations of real pickpocket scenarios. The scene on the video is observed 
through a colour pan-tilt-zoom camera. Six agents are involved in the scenario: 
potential victims (V1, V2, V3) and pickpockets (P, P2, P3) (Figure 3). The 
relevant inanimate objects are the tram, the tram stop, and the road next to the 
tram stop. Relevant actions are standing still, walking and snatching for the 
victims and pickpockets, and moving, standing still and open doors for the tram. 
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Figure 3. Cropped frame from the pickpocket video. The pickpockets are looking for suitable 
victims. 
 
Together, the persons in this scenario step through different phases: The 
pickpockets are loitering at the tram stop to find a victim. When a tram 
approaches in the distance, one pickpocket (P3) selects a candidate victim (V3). 
The victims are queuing to enter the tram (Fig. 4, left) and P1 pushes himself in 
front of V3, P2 is close to V3 in the queue, and P3 moves closer to the queue. P2 
takes something from V3 and gives the loot to P3 under cover of the jackets over 
their arms (Fig. 4, right). Finally, P1 and P2 travel with the tram and P3 (with the 
loot) stays behind at the tram stop. This example is used to illustrate the relevance 
of requirements. 
 
 
Figure 4: Cropped frames from the pickpocket video. The victims enter the tram just before P1 
pushes himself in the queue (left), and while P2 gives the loot to P3 (right). 
 
Table 2 presents the importance of requirements 1-5 through the lens of the 
surveillance patterns on this scenario. It shows how having requirement 5 enables 
the use of more complex surveillance patterns, which allow for more precise and 
complete descriptions of the scenario as can be seen in the column “Summary”. 
The “Alarm Threshold” surveillance pattern selects one type of event in this 
pickpocket scenario that is most indicative, e.g. the snatching, or the event that 
someone stands near the queue, but is not actually boarding the tram. The next 
pattern “Bag of Observations” would select multiple events based on a general 
vicinity of e.g. the tram platform, e.g. the actions of someone observing the 
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platform from a distance, someone jumping the queue and someone not-boarding 
after standing near a queue. When seen together (i.e. within a certain short time 
span and at one location), these observables would be indicative for a pickpocket 
scenario on the tram platform. The surveillance pattern of “Behaviour Profiling” 
allows us to reason that P1 performed several suspicious actions within a short 
time span. The fourth surveillance pattern “Concentric circles of protection” 
allows to take the pure perspective of the asset to be protected against stealing, 
such as wallets. For each person on the tram platform, we would take a number of 
circles, e.g. taking the idea of “personal space” 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_space] as starting point. This would allow 
us to reason about events taking place in e.g. the intimate space of V3, which 
would normally not take place there. The fifth and final surveillance pattern 
“Scenario view” allows us to take into account the interaction between the 
pickpockets and the collaboration around the theft. We can reason about P1 
having interacted with P2 and P3, then moving away from each other, and then 
coming together again on one tram entrance. 
 
Multimedia Tools and Applications 
17 
Table 2 – Five surveillance patterns for the events and actors that are involved in the pickpocket scenario. 
 Events Observing 
platform from 
a distance 
Waiting 
on 
platform 
Communicating 
to someone 
Moving in 
front of 
someone else 
Stalling 
line 
Snatch 
something 
Handing 
something 
over 
Board 
tram 
Remain 
on 
platform 
Summary 
Surveillance 
patterns 
Hypothetical 
detection rate 
High High Low Medium Medium Low Low High High 
Indicativeness of 
scenario 
Low Low Low Low Low High Low Low High 
Alarm Pickpocket      P2    P2 snatched 
Bag of words 
Pickpocket P1 P2, P3, 
V1-3 
P3 tot P2 and P3 
to P1, V1-3 
P1 P1 P2 P2 to P3 P1, P2, 
V1-3 
P3 
All events occurred 
Behaviour 
Profiling 
P1 Yes  Yes Yes Yes   Yes  P1 behaved rude 
P2  Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes  P2 stole something 
P3  Yes Yes      Yes P3 received something 
V1  Yes Yes     Yes  V1 acted normal 
V2  Yes Yes     Yes  V2 acted normal 
V3  Yes Yes     Yes  V3 acted normal 
Concentric 
circles of 
protection 
V3: personal space  V2, V3 V1-3 P1 P1 P2 P2 P1, P2, 
V1-3 
 Close to V3: some 
unusual events with 
several different people 
V3: within 
observation distance 
P1 P1-3 P1-3      P3 Nothing unusual 
around V3 
Scenario 
view 
P
ic
k
p
o
ck
et
 s
ce
n
ar
io
 
Waiting for 
easy victim 
P1 P2, P3, 
V1-3 
       
A specific pickpocket 
scenario took place, it 
involved P1-3 as 
pickpockets and V3 as 
victim. 
Selecting 
victim 
  P3 tot P2 and P3 
to P1, V1-3 
      
Position 
relative to 
victim 
   P1      
Distracting 
intended victim 
    P1     
Snatch 
valuable 
     P2    
Hide Loot       P2 to P3   
Leave location        P1, P2, 
V1-3 
P3 
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We conclude that storing not just the personal data itself, but also metadata about where (Req. 
2) and why (Req. 6) it was recorded explains that a surveillance system is used near a tram 
stop to prevent or mitigate the threat of pickpockets, which may be beneficial for privacy and 
legal aspects. Describing how it was captured and processed (Req. 2-6) explains that a 
surveillance system is, e.g., comprised of human operators with a particular training, or an 
automated processing system that acts on the location of people. Describing the relation 
between raw sensor data, personal data and the use of personal data (Req. 7) gives 
transparency and allows for the correction of errors in the system. For example, in the 
pickpocket case, the alternative hypothesis can also be described that it is not P2 who is the 
thief cooperating with P3, but that P3 is the thief and P2 is actually a victim. The description 
of runtime choices and potential alternatives (Req. 8) gives insight into why certain errors or 
decisions were made. Finally, the description of additional observation requests (Req. 2 and 
9) gives more insight into the amount of invasiveness of the surveillance system, in this case 
the fact that the video zoomed in on these people boarding the tram. 
 
Based on these conclusions, we draw the second main conclusion that these requirements are 
indeed sufficiently rich to describe also the more complex situations in the right amount of 
detail. 
5.3 Evaluation of requirements on existing metadata schemes 
This section describes how current metadata schemes (Sec. 2) address the nine requirements 
(Sec. 4) already. Based on this comparison we can both learn whether the requirements are 
feasible and get an impression of the coverage of these requirements is by current schemes. 
Publicly available data were used to perform the analysis. TRECVID and PETS were also 
included in the analysis, although they are benchmark conferences that use CVML and 
VIPER as schemes. However, in their use of these schemes they have created labels and 
attributes, which alters their fulfilment of several requirements and therefore, they are 
discussed separately. The result of our evaluation is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Comparison of metadata schemes on the 9 defined requirements. Notes: (a) Only probabilities, no alternatives. (b) Not explicitly, but can be modelled. (c) Only some 
general low level signal-related concepts. (d) Scope of human communication. (e) Not explicitly, but can be implemented using software API. (f) Each shot is given a separate 
probability per concept which could be seen as alternative hypotheses. (Fixed) Not possible in general, but available for a fixed set of predefined events/scenarios. 
 
 HUMAN 
ML 
ETISEO I-
LIDS 
Noldus Milestone PSIA MPEG7 CVML ONVIF SAM ANVIL VIPER TRECVID PETS 
1. Coverage of relevant 
domain 
Yes d Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No c Yes Yes Yes No No c No c Yes 
2. Metadata about the sensor No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
3. Metadata about 
features/observations 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
4. Metadata about entities, 
events, actions and their 
attributes.  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Fixed in 
SIN, KIS 
Fixed 
5. Metadata about situations 
and scenarios (relations 
between observables)  
Yes Fixed Fixed Yes No No Yes Fixed No Yes No No Fixed in 
SED, 
MED 
Fixed 
6. Describe goals, 
hypothetical situations and 
scenarios 
No No No No No No Yes No No No No No No No 
7. Traceability No No No No Yes Yes Yes b No Yes Yes No Yes b No No 
8. Uncertainty and alternatives No No No No No No Yes b No Noa Yes No No a Yes f No 
9. Observation capabilities No Yes b Yes b No Yes e Yes Yes b No Yes Yesb No Yes b No No 
Multimedia Tools and Applications 
20 
There is no scheme that fulfils all requirements (i.e. there are no rows completely 
filled with Yes). Some widely used schemes in different scientific communities 
score on about half of the requirements. These metadata representation schemes 
(like CVML and ETISEO) are designed to evaluate specialized research on new 
techniques e.g. in Video Analytics. To get beyond the state of the art these 
schemas facilitate the more abstract requirements 5 and 6, but only in a limited 
form for fixed events and/or scenarios. In an academic setting of researching 
surveillance systems, i.e. where a specific research focus determines the 
constraints, it is not strange to see that requirements 7 and 9 are seldom met. 
 
There are representation schemes that have an open character (e.g. MPEG7, 
VIPER and in extreme XML). Their openness allows them to describe almost 
anything. However, this also has a drawback: the more open a specification, the 
less specific it is. E.g. one might argue to use natural language English for video 
annotation, claiming it has sufficient descriptive power; however, choosing a 
natural language involves considerable loss in specificity and causes ambiguity 
and interpretational issues. For example, MPEG-7 potentially scores very high. 
The only missing requirement seems to be the inclusion of a relevant ontology 
specific for surveillance (Req. 1). Other schemes are also flexible or extensible, 
but none as much as MPEG-7. The great flexibility of MPEG-7 can however also 
negatively impact the ease of use for novices.  CVML has even made a design 
choice that goes against requirements 3: three levels of abstraction are described 
in one XML-tag: “Reporting tracked entities in a scene is done with the <entity> 
tag, where data such as the bounding box and orientation, but also high-level 
information such as role and scenario is provided. Groups of entities have their 
own bounding box, role and scenario, and this is output for each frame in a video 
sequence.” [7] 
 
Some of the representation schemes contain technical detail (e.g. MileStone, 
ONVIF and PSIA). This is understandable since they describe working systems 
and reflect the current state of the technology. From these representation schemes 
we can deduce what is needed to actually implement a complete scheme. 
However, the respective companies and consortia have found no reason (yet) to 
accommodate for requirements 5 and 6 in these formats. 
 
Two of the requirements are seldom met in metadata schemes: (6) goals and 
hypothetical scenarios, and (8) uncertainty and alternatives. This is not 
surprising, as they enable emerging functionality, such as influencing behaviour, 
multi-hypothesis reasoning and autonomous surveillance systems. They might be 
addressed with classical AI frameworks. Since goal is expressed in terms that 
were already needed for other requirements, such as scenario and agent, 
requirement 6 about goals and hypothetical scenarios would require a relatively 
simple extension of the metadata representation scheme. It could even be 
expressed by using the link we already need for traceability to express that this 
scenario does not originate from sensor data, but rather from the mind of an agent. 
 
Requirement 8 uncertainty and alternatives may require some additional work. 
Describing alternatives does not require large changes in schemes, merely the 
flexibility to pass more than one instance of data instead of one. Uncertainty may 
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be slightly more complex. On one hand, it seems easy to pass along one extra 
variable about chance or a distribution of values. On the other hand, the way 
uncertainty should be modelled on data can depend on the data type and on the 
way the data were obtained. This may require a more elaborate description of 
uncertainties. 
 
The third main conclusion is that there is no fundamental problem with 
implementing these requirements, because for every requirement there is at least 
one existing metadata scheme which supports it. In addition, for the requirements 
which have relatively little support, we can give practical guidelines on how they 
could be implemented. 
6. Discussion 
This discussion focusses on suggestions for further development of a metadata 
scheme. We foresee three approaches for further development of metadata 
schemes where the requirements identified in this paper could be applied. The 
first approach is, for example, after a large security incident where a 
reconstruction of the incident must be made from multiple sets of metadata. Such 
a reconstruction could use database linking and ontology alignment; however, 
these are complex processes that require making many choices which impact on 
the usability of the resulting reconstruction. These requirements could serve as a 
guideline for these choices. The second approach is the construction of a new 
metadata scheme that should serve as a unifying metadata scheme among 
surveillance systems of all kinds. This scenario would typically start with a 
thorough stakeholder analysis in order to validate these requirements, and to 
determine the support in the relevant communities for each requirement. Several 
options for fulfilling each requirement may be considered, and multiple metadata 
schemes should be assessed for their fitness as a starting point for the new 
scheme. For example, based on the evaluation of requirements on existing 
schemes, MPEG-7 could be a basis on which to build one coherent scheme, or 
PSIA and ONVIF could extend this (e.g. with MPEG-7), or one of the scientific 
schemes could be gradually extended. Home Office CAST appears to have 
initiated the creation of a new scheme [44]. Ontology linking may be part of such 
a procedure. The third approach is the construction of an ad hoc metadata scheme 
for a local project or software tool. In this scenario the engineers simply go 
through the list of requirements and select those that are required for their own 
goal. In this scenario the requirements are simply a checklist. 
 
The requirements collected here are not meant as requirements for all research and 
development on the areas of surveillance or multimedia. Especially people in 
highly specific disciplines will find them too broad for their own purposes. 
However, when re-using datasets and annotations that were originally created for 
different purposes, these requirements will help to identify where the potential 
pitfalls lie. The actual uptake and use of a metadata scheme involves more than 
can be accomplished with a set of requirements as described in one paper. Also, 
the support for a (new) metadata representation scheme does not only depend on 
the quality of the scheme itself, as we can see on the lack of support for SAM, 
which addresses almost all requirements. In the actual application of these 
requirements, whether for the design of a new scheme or for the slight adaptation 
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of an existing one, the hands on involvement of relevant communities is required. 
Such a process requires workshops with stakeholders, trial-and-error, 
demonstration versions and acceptation tests, and is stimulated with (tools that 
support) backwards compatibility. The authors hope to provide a starting point for 
such a process. 
7. Summary 
This paper describes the requirements for metadata representation schemes for 
scientific research and operational systems in the area of surveillance for security, 
metadata on: the sensor, features and observation, events, entities, their actions 
and attributes, situations and scenario, goals and intent, hypothetical scenarios, 
traceability, alternatives and chance, and additional observation actions. A 
terminology is proposed to define the metadata requirements. We identify and 
describe five common and emerging surveillance design patterns, and evaluate the 
fitness of the requirements on these surveillance patterns, both in breadth as in 
depth with a pickpocket case. We conclude that these are the right requirements 
given these common and emerging surveillance patterns, and these requirements 
are indeed sufficiently rich to describe also the more complex situations in the 
right amount of detail. Finally, we conclude that there is no fundamental problem 
with implementing these requirements, because for every requirement there is at 
least one existing metadata scheme which supports it. In addition, for the 
requirements which have relatively little support, we can give practical guidelines 
on how they could be implemented. There is however no metadata representation 
scheme that fulfils all the requirements. Especially the requirements of relations 
between entities, goals, intents, uncertainty and alternatives are rarely met. Of the 
examined schemes, MPEG7 and SAM fulfil most of the requirements but MPEG7 
might be too expressive in its general form, and SAM has not found much support 
yet. 
Acknowledgements 
This work was performed as independent research of the applied research 
programme Dutch Top sector High Tech Systems & Materials: Roadmap 
Security, Passive Sensors. [9]. The authors thank Aart Beukers (Eye-D Security 
Experts) and the Amsterdam police for kindly providing the instruction video. 
References 
1. Alexander C (1977) A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction 
2. Annesley J, Colombo A, Orwell J, Velastin S (2007) A profile of MPEG-7 for visual 
surveillance, IEEE Int. Conf. AVSS, 482–487 
3. Bouma H, Vogels J, Aarts O, Kruszynski C, Wijn R, Burghouts G (2013) Behavioral profiling 
in CCTV cameras by combining multiple subtle suspicious observations of different 
surveillance operators, Proc. SPIE 8745 
4. Burghouts GJ, Marck J (2011) Reasoning about threats: from observables to situation 
assessment. IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern 41(5):608–616  
5. Buschmann F, Meunier R, Rohnert H, Sommerlad P (1996) Pattern-Oriented Software 
Architecture, Volume 1: A System of Patterns. John Wiley & Sons  
6. CAVIAR: Context aware vision using image-based active recognition. 
http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/rbf/CAVIAR/  
7. CVML: Computer vision markup language. http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/tlist/cvml/spec.html  
Multimedia Tools and Applications 
23 
8. Doermann D, Mihalcik D (2000) Tools and techniques for video performance evaluation. 
ICPR 4:167–170  
9. Dutch top sector high tech systems & materials: Roadmap security, passive sensors. 
http://www.htsm.nl/Roadmaps/Security  
10. ETISIO: Video understanding evaluation. http://www-sop.inria.fr/orion/ETISEO/  
11. Fisher RB (2004) The PETS04 surveillance ground-truth data sets. Proc. 6th IEEE Int. 
Workshop on Performance Evaluation of Tracking and Surveillance, pp 1–5  
12. Francois A, Nevatia R, Hobbs J, Bolles R, Smith JR (2005) VERL: an ontology framework 
for representing and annotating video events. IEEE Multimedia 12(4):76–86  
13. HUMAN ML: Human markup language. https://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/download.php/60/HM.Primary-Base-Spec-1.0.html  
14. I-LIDS: Imagery library for intelligent detection systems. Home Office, UK  
15. INCOSE, a consensus of the INCOSE fellows. http://www.incose.org  
16. Kester LJHM (2008) Designing networked adaptive interactive hybrid systems. IEEE 
Multisensor Fusion and Integration for Intelligent Systems, 2008, MFI 2008, pp 516–521  
17. Kipp M (2013) Anvil: the video research annotation tool. http://www.anvil-software.org/ 
accessed January 4th 2013  
18. Kipp M (2013) Anvil 4.0 Annotation of video and spoken language  
19. La Vigne NG, Lowry SS, Markman JA, Dwyer AM (2011) Evaluating the Use of Public 
Surveillance Cameras for Crime Control and Prevention. Urban Institute, Justice Policy 
Centre.  
20. Lenat DB, Guha RV (1990) Building large knowledge-based systems: representation and 
inference in the CYC project. Addison–Wesley, Reading  
21. List T, Fisher RB (2004) CVML-an XML-based computer vision markup language. Int Conf 
Pattern Recog (ICPR) 1:789–792  
22. Lyon D (2007) Surveillance studies: an overview. Polity Press, Cambridge  
23. Mariano VY, Min J, Park J-H, Kasturi R, Mihalcik D, Li H et al (2002) Performance 
evaluation of object detection algorithms. ICPR 3:965–969  
24. Masolo C, Borgo S, Gangemi A, Guarino N, Oltramari A (2003) Ontology library (final). IST 
Project 2001–33052 WonderWeb Deliverable D18  
25. Milestone. http://www.milestonesys.com/  
26. MPEG-7: Moving pictures expert group  
27. Neely H (2010) Modeling Threat Behaviors in Surveillance Video Metadata for Detection 
using an Analogical Reasoner, IEEE Aerospace conference 
28. Nghiem AT, Bremond F, Thonnat M, Valentin V (2007) ETISEO, performance evaluation for 
video surveillance systems. IEEE Conference On Advanced Video and Signal Based 
Surveillance, AVSS 2007, pp 476–481  
29. Niles I, Pease A (2001) Towards a Standard Upper Ontology. In: Welty C, Smith B (eds) 
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems 
(FOIS-2001), Ogunquit, Maine, October 17–19, 2001  
30. Noldus. www.noldus.com  
31. Online resource pickpocket video  
32. ONVIF: Open network video interface forum. http://www.onvif.org/Home.aspx  
33. Over P, Awad G, Fiscus J, Antonishek B, Michel M, Smeaton AF, et al (2011) Proceedings of 
TRECVID 2010—An overview of the goals, tasks, data, evaluation mechanisms, and metrics, 
Gaithersburg, Md., USA  
34. PETS: Performance evaluation of tracking and surveillance. http://pets2012.net  
35. PSIA: Physical security interoperability alliance. http://www.psialliance.org/  
36. SanMiguel JC, Martinez JM, Garcia A (2009) An ontology for event detection and its 
application in surveillance video, IEEE Int. Conf. AVSS, pp 220–225  
37. Schallauer P, Bailer W, Hofmann A, Mörzinger R (2009) SAM: An interoperable metadata 
model for multimodal surveillance applications. Proc. SPIE, 7344  
38. Sowa JF (1976) Conceptual graphs for a database interface. IBM J Res Dev 20(4):336–357  
39. Sowa JF (1984) Conceptual graphs. Information Processing in Mind and Machine, 39–44  
40. Steinberg AN, Bowman CL, White FE (1999) Revisions to the JDL data fusion model. 
Environmental Research Institute of Michigan Arlington VA  
41. Surveillance of Unattended Baggage and the Identification and Tracking of the Owner 
(SUBITO) consortium (December 2011), SUBITO Deliverable D100.2: Final Report  
42. Suzić R (2005) A generic model of tactical plan recognition for threat assessment. Proc. SPIE  
43. TRECVID: TREC video retrieval evaluation. http://trecvid.nist.gov/  
Multimedia Tools and Applications 
24 
44. UK Home Office, Invitation to Tender Efficient Archive Retrieval & Auto Searching (EARS) 
CONTEST Project http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-
statistics/research-statistics/home-office-science/eoi-ears-hos, Accessed June 2012  
45. VIPER. http://viper-toolkit.sourceforge.net/  
46. Westermann U, Jain R (2007) Toward a common event model for multimedia applications. 
IEEE Multimedia 14(1):19–29 
 
Author biographies 
 
Jeroen van Rest is a lead consultant at TNO (Networked Organisations 
group), the Netherlands. He studied computer science at the University 
Leiden (MSc degree 2002) with specialisation in Multimedia. His research 
interests cover broad scope of multimedia, cognitive systems and privacy 
for security and surveillance. 
 
 
Franc Grootjen is an associate professor Artificial Intelligence at the 
Radboud University (Artificial Intelligence department), the Netherlands. 
He studied Mathematics, Physics and Computing Science at the Radboud 
University Nijmegen, the Netherlands (MSc degree 1992). In 2005 he 
received his PhD degree in Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science at 
the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. His main interest is 
the broad application of mathematical and cognitive techniques in a 
linguistic environment such as Information Retrieval and Knowledge 
Representation. 
 
 
Marc Grootjen is a researcher at TNO (Perceptual and Cognitive Systems 
group), the Netherlands. He is the founder of EagleScience, a human 
factors research oriented company. As a navy officer, he studied 
Mechanical Engineering at the Delft University of Technology (MSc 
degree 2002), the Netherlands. His main interests are: user-centered 
design, video annotation and process control rooms. 
 
Remco Wijn is research scientist at TNO (Human Behaviour & 
Organisational Innovations group), the Netherlands. He studied social 
psychology  at the University of Groningen after which he obtained his 
PhD from Utrecht University on the antecedents and consequences of 
being treated fairly or not. His research topics include (but not limited to) 
behavioural  processes that lead to suspicious behaviours, radicalization, 
and terrorism. The central aim of these projects is determining how 
behaviours linked to these subjects occur and evolve, and recognizing 
them in an early stadium. 
 
Olav Aarts is a scientist  sociology and statistics at TNO (Human 
Behaviour & Organisational Innovations group), the Netherlands. He 
studied sociology and statistics at the Radboud University Nijmegen (MSc 
degree 2004) where he was involved in the Interuniversity Centre for 
Social Science and Methodology. In 2010 he received his PhD at 
Nijmegen University, the Netherlands. Currently, he is conducting 
research in the field of social networks, interaction between culture and 
technology, and statistics.  
 
Multimedia Tools and Applications 
25 
 
Maaike Roelofs is  a  scientist  in human behaviour at TNO (Human 
Behaviour & Organisational Innovations group), the Netherlands. She 
studied Leisure Management at INHOLLAND Diemen, Amsterdam (BBA 
degree 2009), and Management, Economics and Consumer studies at 
Wageningen University (MSc degree 2011). Her specialisations is in 
consumer behaviour and deviant behaviour. Currently, her  interests 
concentrate round behavioural and societal sciences.  
 
 
Gertjan J. Burghouts is a lead scientist in visual pattern recognition at 
TNO (Intelligent Imaging group) , the Netherlands. He studied artificial 
intelligence at the University of Twente (MSc degree 2002) with a 
specialization in pattern analysis and human-machine interaction. In 2007 
he received his PhD from the University of Amsterdam on the topic of 
visual recognition of objects and their motion, in realistic scenes with 
varying conditions. His research interests cover recognition of events and 
behaviours in multimedia data. Currently, he is mainly occupied with 
DARPA project named CORTEX.  
 
Henri Bouma is a research scientist and project manager at TNO in the 
field of computer vision and pattern recognition. He received his MSc in 
Electrical Engineering at the University of Twente and his PhD in 
Biomedical Image Analysis at the TU Eindhoven, the Netherlands. His 
publications include articles in multiple high-impact IEEE journals. Dr. 
Bouma participated in projects about ship recognition for the Dutch 
Ministry of Defence, in the Mind’s Eye program of DARPA for human 
action and behaviour recognition, and he leaded several projects about the 
automatic tracking and behaviour analysis in surveillance video for the 
Dutch Police. 
 
Lejla Alic is a scientist in pattern recognition at TNO (Intelligent Imaging 
group), the Netherlands. She studied Electrical Engineering at Delft 
University of Technology (MSc degree 2001) with a specialization in 
signal and image processing. In 2013 she received her PhD from the 
Erasmus MC in Rotterdam on the topic of pattern recognition in cancer 
treatment prediction and response using multi-modality images. Her 
research interests include many aspects of imaging (processing, analysis, 
pattern recognition) and data annotation in multi-modality data. 
 
Wessel Kraaij is senior research scientist at TNO (Media and Network 
Services) and professor at Radboud University Nijmegen (Institute for 
Computing and Information Sciences / Intelligent Systems / Information 
Foraging Lab), the Netherlands. He studied electrical engineering  at the 
Eindhoven university of Technology  (MSc degree 1988). In 2004  he 
received his PhD from the university of Twente on the topic of language 
modelling for information retrieval. He is joint coordinator of the NIST 
TRECVID benchmark since 2003. His research interests include 
multimedia information retrieval and information aggregation. 
 
 
View publication stats
